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Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving 
Monte Neil Stewart and William C. Duncan∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, a San Francisco trial judge held that California 
voters’ recent reaffirmation of marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman violated the state constitution’s equality guarantee because 
that reaffirmation prevents same-sex couples from marrying.1 In so 
holding, the court relied heavily on what is commonly known in 
“same-sex marriage” discourse as the argument of the Loving 
analogy—an analogy more fairly labeled Perez/Loving. In 1948, the 
California Supreme Court in Perez v. Lippold 2 led the way for the 
nation by holding that statutory prohibitions of interracial marriages 
violated constitutional protections of equality. Then in 1967, the 
United States Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia3 held the same. 
The argument of the Perez/Loving analogy, in its simplest form, 
goes like this: Because it is unconstitutional (as unequal and unfair) 
to prevent a black from marrying a white, it is likewise 
unconstitutional to prevent a man from marrying a man or a woman 
from marrying a woman. 
The argument of the Perez/Loving analogy4 is not only 
ubiquitous in genderless marriage cases5 but is also ubiquitous in the 
 ∗ This Article is available online at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org. The authors 
acknowledge the superb research assistance relative to this Article provided by Glenn Roper, 
Anne Hancock, Rob Mooney, and Eric Jenkins. The authors wish especially to thank Mike 
Erickson for his superb assistance in readying the Article for publication. 
 1. In re Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 
14, 2005). 
 2. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 4. Hereafter “the Perez/Loving argument.” 
 5. Rather than use the more common phrase “same-sex marriage,” this Article uses the 
phrase “genderless marriage” to refer to a form of civil marriage defined as the union of any 
two persons. The phrase “same-sex marriage” is subtly misleading; although the legal 
definition of civil marriage as the union of any two persons would allow same-sex couples to 
marry, it, of course, also would allow a woman and a man to marry, and everywhere the debate 
focuses on one legally recognized relationship known as marriage, not two. The phrase “same-
sex marriage” thus conveys the sense (erroneously) of a legally recognized marriage separate or 
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popular debate on the meaning of civil marriage, no doubt because 
the argument is simple—that is, easy to make and easy to grasp—and 
thus well suited to a “sound bite” political culture. It also seems fair 
to say that the argument is a favorite of those advocating the 
redefinition of marriage as the union of any two persons and that it is 
likewise a media darling. 
A. A Suggestion of Betrayal 
Sometimes, but not always, simple arguments are flawed by 
superficiality. That is, they work at the surface level, at the level of 
the obvious, but are defeated by deeper realites constituting the 
subject of the argument. The subject of the Perez/Loving argument 
is, of course, marriage. Recent work investigating the realities 
constituting marriage6 suggests that the argument is flawed by 
superficiality. In a more startling and grave progression, however, 
that work also suggests that judicial adoption of the Perez/Loving 
argument amounts to a betrayal of those two landmark cases. This 
Article assesses the validity of this suggestion of betrayal—a 
suggestion summarized in unvarnished fashion in the following 
paragraphs.7  
Marriage is a vital social institution. As such, it is constituted by a 
complex web of shared public meanings, with a core meaning 
being—across cultures and time—the union of a man and a woman. 
Like other powerful social institutions, marriage performs an 
important educative and socializing function. In its sphere, the 
marriage institution shapes and guides individuals’ identities, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct, including what they believe to 
be important and what they strive to achieve. It is in this way that 
different from the marriage of a man and a woman. This Article refers to civil marriage defined 
as the union of a man and a woman as “man/woman marriage.” The term “genderless” is used 
instead of “nongendered” and “man/woman” instead of “gendered” because, as a matter of 
contemporary language usage, use of the words “gendered” and “nongendered” could be seen 
as an endorsement of certain versions of social constructionist thought. Although those 
versions may be valid, this Article stands neutral on the validity question for reasons made clear 
elsewhere. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 11, 85–
95 (2004), available at http://www.manwomanmarriage.org/jrm/pdf/jrm.pdf. 
 6. E.g., Daniel Cere, War of the Ring, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE 
DANGERS IN CANADA’S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 9, 15 (Daniel Cere & Douglas Farrow eds., 
2004) [hereinafter DIVORCING MARRIAGE]; Stewart, supra note 5, at 75–85.  
 7. Because this is merely a summary, footnotes are not used. Attribution for the ideas 
contained in the summary appears in footnotes in later sections. 
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the constitutive meanings of marriage provide valuable social goods, 
some uniquely. 
The law has a role relative to the marriage institution, as it does 
with other social institutions of betterment. In support, the law gives 
marriage formal recognition, brings legal and administrative 
arrangements into line with institutional practices, facilitates the 
institution’s use by members of the community, and encourages the 
transmission of institutional values from generation to generation. 
But the law can also change or even dismantle an institution—it does 
so by changing or suppressing the shared public meanings 
constituting the institution. 
Because marriage has a powerful educative role in our society—a 
power reinforced by the supporting law’s authoritative voice—the 
marriage institution is a tempting target for those seeking to advance 
the sociopolitical purposes of an ideology unrelated to marriage. If 
those so seeking can appropriate the institution and bend it to their 
purposes, they have gone far in assuring the triumph of their agenda. 
In the American past, two social movements temporarily 
succeeded in using marriage as a means to achieve ulterior ends: the 
white supremacist movement and the eugenics movement. In fact, 
the antimiscegenation laws were often found in the same legislative 
package as the laws calling for the sterilization of “idiots” and other 
so-called “genetic undesirables.” Central to the white supremacists’ 
project was the alteration of the core meaning of marriage from the 
union of a man and a woman to the union of a man and a woman of 
the same “race.” Laws that prohibited blacks from marrying whites 
were an ugly feature grafted onto the marriage institution—the very 
logic of which makes the graft a foreign object. The voice of those 
laws, however, greatly magnified by social institutional power, subtly 
but effectively inculcated throughout society the core dogma of 
white supremacy. The courts that gave us the Perez and Loving 
decisions apprehended the white supremacists’ marriage project for 
what it was and rightly used constitutional equality norms to 
dismantle it. In the process, those courts restored to marriage the 
integrity of its institutional purposes and logic, an historic 
accomplishment. It is that accomplishment that is now being 
betrayed. 
The goal of the gay/lesbian rights movement’s marriage project, 
like that of the white supremacists, is to appropriate the institution 
and change it to achieve sociopolitical purposes unrelated to 
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marriage. Again, that change entails an alteration in a core, 
constitutive meaning: from the union of a man and a woman to the 
union of any two persons. Granted that the respective objectives of 
the old and the new marriage projects are very different, still the 
projects in their appropriative strategy are of a kind. 
Thus, because Perez and Loving refused to allow the marriage 
institution to be appropriated for nonmarriage ends, to use those 
two cases to advance just such an appropriative project is to betray 
them. In other words, the Perez/Loving argument advances a 
superficial analogy that masks a deep disanalogy. That disanalogy is 
between the intention of Perez and Loving to protect marriage from 
appropriation for nonmarriage purposes and the intention of the 
present marriage project to make such an appropriation. Thus, those 
who deploy the Perez/Loving argument, whether advocates or 
judges, are misleading people, including perhaps themselves.  
Nor is this betrayal cured by an appeal to Perez’s and Loving’s 
vindication of constitutional equality norms—that is, by the 
argument that whereas the white supremacist marriage project 
fostered inequality by the exclusiveness of the antimiscegenation laws, 
the new marriage project fosters equality by the inclusiveness of its 
different redefinition of marriage. This, of course, is an argument 
that the ends justify the means, but the argument steadfastly ignores 
certain realities regarding those means. One such reality is that an 
institution constituted by the core meaning of “the union of any two 
persons” is not a modification of the marriage institution but a 
radically different alternative to it. Another reality is that, backed by 
the force of constitutional law, the new institution will, in not many 
years, displace and, in that fashion, destroy (deinstitutionalize) the 
old institution. For it is clear that society cannot, at one and the 
same time, tell the people (and especially the children) that marriage, 
in its core meaning, is the union of any two persons and that 
marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of a man and a woman. 
Finally, when the marriage institution goes, its array of valuable 
social goods, many unique, goes also. 
An “equality” enshrined at such a cost to human development 
and social welfare is not the equality vindicated by Perez and Loving 
or otherwise intended by our constitutional norms.  
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B. The Structure of the Article 
The foregoing is the unvarnished suggestion that we mean to 
address in some detail to see how it holds up. Before giving the 
roadmap to that endeavor, however, we need to say a word about a 
volatile subject: discussion of the gay/lesbian rights movement in a 
context that also encompasses the white supremacist movement. We 
ask that the reader in good faith (the only one we are writing for) 
not jump to the conclusion that we are equating Bill Eskridge with 
Bull Connor or the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 
with the Klu Klux Klan; if she does so, we are not apt to be given a 
thoughtful read. What we are doing is considering whether those 
two movements have employed an essentially similar strategy relative 
to marriage. If so, that is something worth knowing, and knowing it 
may lead to other things worth knowing. That those two movements 
have profoundly different objectives goes without saying. Whether 
that difference justifies the present use of the older movement’s 
strategy (if that is so) also seems to us worth some thoughtful 
analysis. So with apologies to any who may take offense at our choice 
to investigate these matters, we will go forward. 
In Part II, we set forth the understandings and implications of 
marriage as a social institution. In Part III, we review both the white 
supremacist marriage project that resulted in the antimiscegenation 
laws and the work of the Perez and Loving courts in dismantling that 
project. In Part IV, we trace the use of the Perez/Loving argument 
over the past three decades—the period in which advocates have 
sought to redefine marriage as the union of any two persons. 
Because use of the argument has been ubiquitous, this exercise 
provides a good overview of the genderless marriage issue in the 
courts. Part V goes to the heart of the matter. It considers the 
evidence that the gay/lesbian rights movement, following a strategy 
analogous to the white supremacist movement, is trying to 
appropriate marriage by changing its core meaning contrary to the 
institution’s purposes and logic, for the purpose of advancing a 
social, cultural, and political agenda essentially unrelated to 
marriage.8 Part VI concludes with reflections on likely consequences 
if the new marriage project succeeds. 
 8. These comments on terminology seem merited: When we speak of marriage’s 
“institutional purposes and logic” or words to that effect, we are referring not to the entire 
complex of purposes and values inhering in the social institution of marriage as now 
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II. MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 
Marriage is a social institution.9 As such, it shares with all other 
social institutions certain salient features. Or stated slightly 
differently, what can be said accurately about all social institutions 
can be said accurately of the institution of marriage. One of the most 
important understandings is this: social institutions are constituted in 
large measure by shared public meanings. Although in pedestrian use 
the word “institution” may conjure up an image of an edifice 
constructed of steel, concrete, and glass, a social institution is not so 
constituted. Rather, it is “constituted by complex webs of social 
meaning.”10 John Searle explains this social reality using the example 
of another social institution, money: 
[W]e can say, for example, in order that the concept ‘money’ apply 
to the stuff in my pocket, it has to be the sort of thing that people 
think is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it ceases to 
function as money, and eventually ceases to be money. . . . [I]n 
order that a type of thing should satisfy the definition, in order that 
it should fall under the concept of money, it must be believed to 
be, or used as, or regarded as, etc., satisfying the definition. . . . 
And what goes for money goes for elections, private property, wars, 
experienced in American society; rather, we are referring to those components of that complex 
that three decades of court cases show to be most relevant to the genderless marriage issue. 
These components include the private welfare purpose discussed previously by Stewart, supra 
note 5, at 44–46, and summarized in these words: “Hence, what is understood to be a 
fundamental and originating purpose of marriage: to confine procreative passion to a setting, a 
social institution actually, that will assure, to the largest practical extent, that passion’s 
consequences (children) begin and continue life with adequate private welfare.” Id. at 45. Still 
focusing on children, another purpose is to make real the child’s right to know and to be 
brought up by his or her biological parents (with exceptions being justified only in the best 
interests of the child, not those of any adult). Another purpose is to bridge the male-female 
divide. Yet another is to confer the status of husband and wife and to transform identity and 
conduct in a way consistent with that status. For more on these purposes, see infra Part VI. 
When we speak of the use of the marriage institution for “nonmarriage” purposes or words to 
that effect, we mean purposes not logically consistent with the purposes just identified or 
actually inimical to them. This terminology is used not to pass moral or normative judgment 
on the nonmarriage purposes but to describe what seems to be a feature of those purposes 
important in the context of the Perez/Loving argument. 
 9. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (“[T]he marriage 
relation [is] an institution more basic in our civilization than any other.”); Goodridge v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (“Marriage is a vital social institution.”). 
 10. Stewart, supra note 5, at 83. 
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voting, promises, marriages, buying and selling, political offices, 
and so on.11
The shared meanings that constitute a social institution interact 
and are interdependent; each meaning affects and is dependent on all 
the others. “An institution is a web of interrelated norms—formal and 
informal—governing social relationships.”12
Social institutions shape and guide individuals’ identities, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct. An institution “supplies to the 
people who participate in it what they should aim for, dictates what 
is acceptable or effective for them to do, and teaches how they must 
relate to other members of the institution and to those on the 
outside.”13 This profound influence ought not to be underestimated; 
institutions “shape[] what those who participate in [them] think of 
themselves and of one another, what they believe to be important, 
and what they strive to achieve.”14 Thus,  
an institution guides and sustains individual identity in the same 
way as a family, forming individuals by enabling or disabling certain 
ways of behaving and relating to others, so that each individual’s 
possibilities depend on the opportunities opened up within the 
institution to which the person belongs.15 
But inasmuch as human societies create and sustain social 
institutions, a society can change its social institutions. “Institutions 
can be changed in the sense that they will necessarily change if 
sufficiently many individuals try to change them.”16 And because 
social institutions are constituted by shared public meanings, they are 
necessarily changed when those meanings are changed and/or no 
longer sufficiently shared. Indeed, that is the only way a social 
institution can be changed. 
An individual may withdraw his deposit from a bank, or break the 
law, or the rules [of] a game, without causing the change or 
 11. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 32 (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
 12. Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: Institutions, Exchange, and 
Social Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19, 19 (Mary C. Brinton & 
Victor Nee eds., 1998). 
 13. Stewart, supra note 5, at 111.  
 14. Id. 
 15. HELEN REECE, DIVORCING RESPONSIBLY 185 (2003). 
 16. EERIK LAGERSPETZ, THE OPPOSITE MIRRORS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
CONVENTIONALIST THEORY OF INSTITUTIONS 28 (1995). 
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collapse of the institutions concerned. Such an action would not be 
possible for all individuals acting as a collective [without causing 
that change or collapse]. Conversely, there are acts which are 
possible only for all individuals, but not for any single individual. 
Changing, creating, maintaining or destroying institutions are 
examples of this.17
Just as social institutions can be changed by alteration of the 
constitutive shared public meanings, so they can be renewed and 
strengthened by use consistent with those shared public meanings. 
[A]s several social theorists have pointed out, institutions are not 
worn out by continued use, but each use of the institution is in a 
sense a renewal of that institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we 
use them but constant use renews and strengthens institutions such 
as marriage, property, and universities. . . . [I]n terms of the 
continued collective intentionality of the users, each use of the 
institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users 
to the institution.18
And just as social institutions can be changed or reinforced, 
social institutions can be entirely dismantled. 
The secret of understanding the continued existence of institutional 
facts is simply that the individuals directly involved and a sufficient 
number of members of the relevant community must continue to 
recognize and accept the existence of such facts. . . . The moment, 
for example, that all or most of the members of a society refuse to 
acknowledge [the social institution of] property rights, as in a 
revolution or other upheaval, property rights cease to exist in that 
society. 19 
Society can use the law effectively to reinforce, to alter, or to 
dismantle a social institution. This is because the law has an 
expressive or educative function that is magnified by its authoritative 
voice.20 And in actual practice, the law’s authoritative voice is used to 
 17. Eerik Lagerspetz, On the Existence of Institution, in ON THE NATURE OF SOCIAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL REALITY 70, 82 (Eerik Lagerspetz et al. eds., 2001). 
 18. SEARLE, supra note 11, at 57 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. at 117. 
 20. E.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 162 (1986) (“Supporting valuable 
forms of life is a social rather than an individual matter. Monogamy, assuming that it is the 
only morally valuable form of marriage, cannot be practised by an individual. It requires a 
culture which recognizes it, and which supports it through the public’s attitude and through 
1STEWART.FIN 8/26/2005 12:01 PM 
555] Betrayal of Perez and Loving 
 563 
 
reinforce, to alter, or to dismantle the shared public meanings that 
constitute a social institution. Regarding the reinforcing function, 
Joseph Raz observes: 
Perfectionist political action may be taken in support of social 
institutions which enjoy unanimous support in the community, in 
order to give them formal recognition, bring legal and 
administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use 
by members of the community who wish to do so, and encourage 
the transmission of belief in their value to future generations. In 
many countries this is the significance of the legal recognition of 
monogamous marriage and prohibition of polygamy.21
Use of the law to reinforce or alter or extinguish the shared 
public meanings that constitute a social institution is a political act. 
As Edward Schiappa notes, “Definitions put into practice a special 
sort of social knowledge—a shared understanding among people 
about themselves, the objects of their world, and how they ought to 
use language.”22 He continues: 
If we look hard enough, all definitions serve some sort of interests 
. . . . Defining what is or is not part of our shared reality is a 
profoundly political act. The establishment of authoritative 
definitions by law or custom requires a political process involving 
persuasion or force that generates political results by advancing 
some views and interests and not others.23
To alter a social institution by altering the shared public 
meanings that constitute it (whether by use of the law or otherwise) 
is to alter—if not immediately then certainly soon—the individual 
identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct formed by reference 
to the old institution. The greater the alteration to the institution, 
the greater the changes in the individual. Likewise, the more 
influential the social institution being changed, the greater the 
changes in the individual.24
its formal institutions.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 69–71 (1996). 
 21. RAZ, supra note 20, at 161. 
 22. EDWARD SCHIAPPA, DEFINING REALITY: DEFINITIONS AND THE POLITICS OF 
MEANING 3 (2003). 
 23. Id. at 69–70 (citation omitted). 
 24. E.g., RAZ, supra note 20, at 392. 
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Almost universally, a shared, public, and core meaning 
(constituting the social institution of marriage) is that marriage is the 
union of a man and a woman.25 That meaning has been a 
constitutive core of the institution in the American experience. That 
core meaning has been and continues to be influential in forming 
individual identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct in a way 
and to an extent that common sense readily comprehends. 
[M]arriage is an institution that interacts with a unique social-
sexual ecology in human life. It bridges the male-female divide. It 
negotiates a stable partnership of life and property. It seeks to 
manage the procreative process and to establish parental obligations 
to offspring. It supports the birthright of children to be connected 
to their mothers and fathers. 
 . . . . 
 Michael Foucault contends that marriage has fostered a 
particular type of human identity, namely, the “conjugal self.” Be 
that as it may, marriage has always been the central cultural site of 
male-female relations. A rich history and a complex heritage of 
symbols, myths, theologies, traditions, poetry, and art have been 
generated by the institution of marriage, which encodes a unique 
set of aspirations into human culture along the axis of permanent 
opposite-sex bonding and parent-child connectedness.26
Man/woman marriage is deemed to provide well, and even 
uniquely, a number of social goods besides those just identified. It is 
the only institution that can confer the status of husband and wife;27 
in particular, it is the only effective means to socialize and acculturate 
and thereby transform males into husbands—a process the institution 
sustains both before and after the wedding.28 The institution 
performs the same transformative role in the creation of 
 25. As put by Justice Blair in the Ontario Divisional Court decision in Halpern v. 
Toronto, 60 O.R.3d 321 (Ont. Div. Ct. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 65 O.R.3d 161 
(Ont. 2003), “Anthropological, sociological and historical studies reveal that from time 
immemorial ‘marriage’ has almost universally been viewed as a monogamous union between a 
man and a woman.” Id. at para. 40. For more on the appellate decision in the Halpern case, 
see infra note 145 and text accompanying notes 167 and 171.  
 26. Cere, supra note 6, at 11, 14 (footnote omitted). 
 27. See F.C. DeCoste, The Halpern Transformation: Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Society, 
and the Limits of Liberal Law, 41 ALBERTA L. REV. 619, 625–26 (2003). 
 28. See Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in 
DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 41, 47–48. 
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husband/fathers, another identity beneficially different than that of a 
mere male.29 It also promotes (by privileging) that form of adult 
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may 
rationally value above all other such forms.30
A social institution defined at its core as the union of any two 
persons is unmistakably different from the historic marriage 
institution.31
 Much has been and can be said about public meanings 
influencing, [or] constituting, social institutions, which in turn 
influence, even define, the human participants. All of that can be 
said, of course, about both man/woman marriage as an institution 
and genderless marriage as an institution. The point is the high 
likelihood that an institution defined at its core as the union of a 
man and a woman (with all that limitation implies and entails 
regarding purposes and activities) will intend and sustain “the social 
understandings, the practices, the goods, and the social selves” in 
large measure not intended or sustained by an institution defined at 
its core as any two persons in a close personal relationship.32
The difference in constitutive meanings of necessity means that 
what the new institution teaches relative to individual identity, 
perceptions, aspirations, and conduct is substantially different from 
the formative instruction of the current institution of man/woman 
marriage. That does not mean, of course, that there is no overlap in 
formative instruction; the significance is in the divergence. One 
important divergence centers on the normativeness of married 
heterosexual relations and the normative exceptionality of all other 
forms of intimate human conduct. Another centers on the relative 
pre-eminence or subordination of the interests and desires of adults, 
 29. See, e.g., DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 139–88 (1996). 
 30. Stewart, supra note 5, at 52–57. 
 31. Observers of marriage who are both rigorous and well informed regarding the 
realities of social institutions uniformly acknowledge the magnitude of these differences 
between the two possible institutions of marriage. This is so regardless of the observers’ own 
sexual, political, or theoretical orientation or preference. See, e.g., LADELLE MCWHORTER, 
BODIES AND PLEASURES: FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION 125 
(1999); RAZ, supra note 20, at 393; Cere, supra note 6, at 11–18; Douglas Farrow, Canada’s 
Romantic Mistake, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 1, 1–5; Young & Nathanson, 
supra note 28, at 48–56. 
 32. Stewart, supra note 5, at 77 (footnote omitted). 
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on one hand, and of the interests and needs of children, on the other 
hand.33
Redefinition has other practical outcomes. For our purposes, 
perhaps the most important is found at the intersection of the law’s 
authoritative role (relative to marriage’s meanings) and the unitary 
nature of the institution. By unitary nature, we mean simply that 
society can sustain one and only one marriage institution. Society 
cannot, at one and the same time, tell the people (and especially the 
children) that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of any two 
persons and that marriage, in its core meaning, is the union of a man 
and a woman. Given the role of language and meaning in 
constituting and sustaining institutions, two “coexisting” social 
institutions known society-wide as marriage would seem to amount 
to a factual impossibility. When we speak of law’s authoritative role 
relative to marriage’s meaning, we are thinking of this: Once the law 
(on constitutional grounds no less) has taken a stand that the core 
meaning is the union of any two persons, the law will then be 
unrelenting and thoroughgoing in enforcement of that decision. The 
law’s own internal logic and institutional mandates require no less. 
Thus, at the intersection of the unitary nature of marriage and the 
law’s authoritative role in marriage’s meaning, what will result is the 
new meaning being mandated in texts, in schools, and in virtually 
every other part of the public square, and also being voluntarily 
published by the media and other institutions.34 Even linguistic, 
social, or religious enclaves dedicated to preserving the old meaning 
will have a difficult time.35
 33. See Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, 
supra note 6, at 66–67, 78; Seana Sugrue, Marriage: Inside and Out 14–15 (paper presented at 
Illuminating Marriage Conference, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, May 18–20, 2005, on file 
with author)(“Hence, same-sex marriage as well as a number of other marital reforms, . . . 
foster the vulnerability of children to advance the desires of adults.”). 
 34. Id. at 111. 
 35. Helen Reece explains: 
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm 
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who 
are dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial 
norm community. But this is not a complete solution because the social 
construction of choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem 
unthinkable or may be too costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it 
may also be merely reactive to or even defined by the dominant norm community. 
REECE, supra note 15, at 38. 
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This repetition seems merited. These realities regarding social 
institutions in general and the social institution of marriage in 
particular are not controversial in the literature on the nature of 
institutions. Although each side’s “spin” and emphasis in the current 
genderless marriage debate differ dramatically, no scholarship (to 
date, anyway) has attempted to refute the social realities summarized 
above. And, as we show next, it seems clear that the leaders of the 
white supremacist movement apprehended these social realities and 
built a cunning strategy based on that understanding. 
III. THE ASCENDANCY AND THE DISMANTLING OF THE WHITE 
SUPREMACISTS’ MARRIAGE PROJECT 
A. The Ascendancy 
The history of antimiscegenation laws in the United States shows 
their purpose to be the promotion of white supremacy. “Under the 
common law of England, difference in race was not a disability 
rendering parties incapable of contracting marriage.”36 Although in 
some areas of the United States antimiscegenation laws date back to 
colonial times,37 a number of Southern states had no 
antimiscegenation statutes before the Civil War.38 One commentator 
noted that “[d]uring Reconstruction, anti-miscegenation laws, which 
had assumed a relatively minor position in Southern slave codes, 
spread to a number of Southern states for the first time.”39 Despite 
being of comparatively late origin, these laws took a deep hold in the 
South, and whereas “many states repealed their anti-miscegenation 
laws after ratification of the Civil War amendments, most Southern 
states did not.”40 Even in those states declining repeal, a very few 
early cases accepted the claim that the 1866 Civil Rights Act 
 36. Robert Kovach, Note, Miscegenation Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 89 (1949). 
 37. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 
1860s–1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 389 (1994). 
 38. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1297, 1345 n.172 (1998); Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 372. 
 39. Hasday, supra note 38, at 1345. 
 40. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation 
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1993) (citing ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND 
THE LAW 64 (1972)). 
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invalidated antimiscegenation laws.41 But as late as 1910, twenty-
eight states still had antimiscegenation laws in effect; sixteen such 
laws were still in effect at the time of the decision in Loving in 
1967.42
Although on their face the statutes only redefined marriage laws, 
numerous sources support the idea that the true aim of these statutes 
was to promote the white supremacist agenda. One commentator 
has pointed out that “it is clear that the prohibitions on racial 
intermarriage were indeed intended to be, among other things, 
‘badges and incidents of slavery.’”43 She also argues that “Southern 
antimiscegenation laws trumpeted the message that White families 
should close ranks to exclude and thus socially subordinate inferior 
Blacks.”44 Another author has said that “[w]hite supremacists viewed 
interracial marriage as an abomination possibly resulting in the 
annihilation of the white race along with all of its concomitant glory. 
Legal restrictions on miscegenation were therefore necessary to 
prevent this perceived debacle.”45 A 1912 treatise on Georgia 
constitutional law described antimiscegenation laws as “erect[ing] a 
barrier behind which legitimate home life should be sheltered from 
African admixture.”46 A 1931 treatise says that “racial prejudice, 
social or ethnological considerations, or the dogma of white 
superiority, have resulted in the prohibition of inter-racial 
marriages.”47 And in the Dred Scott decision, “Chief Justice Roger B. 
Taney had stressed state laws banning marriage between blacks and 
whites to support the conclusion that blacks were not citizens.”48
 41. Hasday, supra note 38, at 1365–66; Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific 
Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 600 
(2000). 
 42. Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: Population 
Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian Americans, 1910–1950, 9 
ASIAN L.J. 1, 5, 14 (2002); Trosino, supra note 40, at 98. 
 43. Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between Us”: Antimiscegenation, 
the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 873, 926 (1995). 
 44. Id. at 908. 
 45. Trosino, supra note 40, at 100. 
 46. Van Tassel, supra note 43, at 905 (quoting WALTER MCELREATH, A TREATISE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 145 (1912)). 
 47. CHESTER G. VERNIER, 1 AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 204 (1931). 
 48. Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 379 (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 393, 408 (1857)). 
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Moreover, by the early twentieth century, antimiscegenation laws 
were largely confined to the Western and Southern states. 
Commenting on this fact, the 1931 treatise said: 
 The peculiarly geographic distribution of statutes prohibiting 
racial intermarriage forces one to conclude (all logical justification 
to the contrary, notwithstanding) that such legislation is not based 
primarily upon physiological, psychological, or other scientific 
bases, but is for the most part the product of local prejudice and of 
local effort to protect the social and economic standards of the 
white race.49
A historical analysis also shows that fears of interracial marriage 
were used to fuel opposition to Reconstruction Era civil rights laws.50 
In fact, antimiscegenation laws were part of a “triad”—together with 
restrictions on public accommodations and social equality—which 
became “a rallying cry for the force of ‘white supremacy.’”51
The racial fixation of these laws is further illustrated by their ties 
to eugenic theories.52 Professor Keith Sealing notes that “[t]he 
marriage of scientific racism and the former slaveholders’ need for 
anti-miscegenation laws created long-lived progeny.”53 Professor 
Jennifer Wriggins similarly says that these laws “were also aimed at 
keeping the ‘blood’ of the white race pure and uncontaminated by 
‘black blood,’ which was thought to transmit inferior intellect and 
other inferior traits.”54 “While many [Jim Crow] statutes dictated 
separation broadly between the ‘white and colored races,’ the 
drafters of anti-miscegenation laws took much greater pains to 
specify the particular racial groups to whom those restrictions 
applied.”55 In fact, over time, antimiscegenation laws were changed 
to increase the racial restrictions, moving them toward a “one-drop” 
rule.56 For instance, in 1927 Alabama changed its antimiscegenation 
law to make “the definition of a white person . . . more exclusive 
 49. VERNIER, supra note 47, at 204–05. 
 50. Van Tassel, supra note 43, at 906. 
 51. Id. at 899. 
 52. Karthikeyan & Chin, supra note 42, at 21–23. 
 53. Sealing, supra note 41, at 606. 
 54. Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in 
Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1997). 
 55. Karthikeyan & Chin, supra note 42, at 6. 
 56. Wallenstein, supra note 37, at 395, 406. 
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than ever before”57 by defining a “negro” as a person who has 
“negro ancestors, without reference to or limit of time or number of 
generations removed.”58 Prosecutions based on antimiscegenation 
laws often hinged on racial identity.59
In summary, the antimiscegenation laws were a consequence of 
racial dogma and not of the purposes and logic of marriage as 
understood for many centuries before.60 In David Wagner’s phrasing, 
the antimiscegenation laws must be seen as a logical extension of 
racial law, not of marriage law.61
B. The Dismantling of the Genderless Marriage Agenda 
Language in the Perez and Loving decisions points to a judicial 
understanding that, with these kinds of laws, white supremacists had 
appropriated the law of marriage to promote their ideological 
program. In each case, the court looked beyond the nominal 
regulation of marriage and exposed the white supremacist ideology 
that enactment of the laws sought to advance. 
1. Perez v. Lippold 
In Perez v. Lippold,62 a county clerk refused to issue a marriage 
license because of the applicants’ answers to a form question about 
their race. The clerk relied on a statute that prohibited not any 
interracial marriage, but only marriages between white persons and 
those of other races.63 The standard used by the California Supreme 
Court in reviewing the law was clear: “There can be no prohibition 
of marriage except for an important social objective and by 
reasonable means.”64 As the court further articulated, “[l]egislation 
infringing [marriage] rights must be based upon more than prejudice 
 57. Id. at 407. 
 58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of Sept. 6, 1927, No. 626, § 5, 
1927 Ala. Acts 716, 717). 
 59. Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial 
Marriage: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia, 1860s–1960s, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557, 561–62 (1999). 
 60. As to those “purposes and logic,” see supra note 8. 
 61. David Wagner, Why Goodridge Isn’t Loving, Address at the Conference on State 
Marriage Amendments at Georgia State University (Apr. 16, 2005). 
 62. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 63. Id. at 18. 
 64. Id. at 19. 
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and must be free from oppressive discrimination” to be 
constitutional.65 For the court, the relevant question was “whether 
the state can restrict that right on the basis of race alone.”66 The 
court concluded that the state could not.67
In its opinion, the court outlined the relevant standard for the 
regulation of marriage, holding that the state could regulate 
marriage for health reasons but that any such regulation “must apply 
to all persons regardless of race.”68 The court found that the 
California regulations prohibiting a white person from marrying a 
person of another race did not do so and that, “[b]y restricting the 
individuals’s [sic] right to marry on the basis of race alone, they” 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.69 Noting that “[r]ace 
restrictions must be viewed with great suspicion,” the court further 
held that “[a]ny state legislation discriminating against persons on 
the basis of race or color has to overcome the strong presumption 
[against such discrimination] inherent in this constitutional policy.”70
In striking down the laws at issue, the court relied in part on its 
finding of racial animus behind the laws. It noted that the 
antimiscegenation statutes had been enacted along with other racial 
classifications71 and that the case law upholding such statutes 
contained a number of prejudicial statements about nonwhite races.72 
Further noting that the law applied only to interracial marriages 
involving whites, the court suggested that the law was “based upon 
the theory that the progeny of a white person and a Mongolian or 
Negro or Malay are inferior or undesirable, while the progeny of 
other different races are not.”73 The court also made much of the 
statute’s failure to address mixed-race individuals and of the 
difficulties with legislative definitions of race, given the purported 
intent of the laws as preventing problems with the offspring of 
interracial marriages.74 In its conclusion, the court stated that the 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 29.  
 68. Id. at 21. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 21–22. 
 72. Id. at 22. 
 73. Id. at 23. 
 74. Id. at 28. 
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challenged laws “violate the equal protection of the laws clause of 
the United States Constitution by impairing the right of individuals 
to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and unreasonably 
discriminating against certain racial groups.”75
Justice Carter’s concurrence also noted that the 
antimiscegenation laws were “the product of ignorance, prejudice 
and intolerance.”76 To Justice Carter, the relevant constitutional 
value was “that all human beings have equal rights regardless of race, 
color or creed, and that the right to liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness is inalienable and may not be infringed because of race, 
color or creed.”77 He believed that “the matter of race equality 
should be a settled issue” and “that it is not possible for the 
Legislature, in the face of our fundamental law, to enact a valid 
statute which proscribes conduct on a purely racial basis.”78 Justice 
Carter noted that marriage involves the “pursuit of happiness in its 
clearest and most universally approved form.”79 A corollary to this 
principle is that “an infringement of that right by means of a racial 
restriction is an unlawful infringement of one’s liberty.”80
After the Perez decision was handed down, the commentators 
lauded the decision’s emphasis on the invalidating racial nature of 
the classification. For instance, one commentator placed the Perez 
decision in the context of then-recent court trends: “The past two 
years have witnessed significant developments by the courts in 
checking discrimination against minority racial groups.”81 Many 
other commentators made similar observations.82  
 75. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. (Carter, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 31. 
 81. Robert T. Hurwitz, Recent Case, 37 CAL. L. REV. 122, 122 (1949). 
 82. Donald D. Davis, Recent Case, 47 MICH. L. REV. 834 (1949); Francis J. Keating, 
Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948), 24 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 410 (1949); Kovach, 
supra note 36; Arturo G. Ortega, Recent Case, 37 GEO. L.J. 442 (1949); Alice Helen Sofis, 
Note, The Constitution and Anti-Miscegenation Statutes, 10 PITT. L. REV. 364 (1948); 
Theodore C. Sorenson, Recent Case, 28 NEB. L. REV. 475 (1949); William F. Whetmore, Jr., 
Recent Case, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (1948); Case Note, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 303 (1949); 
Recent Case, 33 MINN. L. REV. 530 (1948–49); Note, Constitutionality of State Anti-
Miscegenation Statutes, 43 NW. U. L. REV. 866 (1949); Recent Case, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 438 
(1949); Recent Case, 2 VAND. L. REV. 307 (1949). 
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2. Loving v. Virginia 
Virginia contained similar invalid racial classifications in its 
marriage laws. Professor Walter Wadlington noted this about the 
Virginia laws just prior to their review by the United States Supreme 
Court in Loving v. Virginia:83 “It may seem surprising that a state 
which regularly recalls with glowing sentiment the story of how one 
of her early white sons married an Indian princess today maintains 
one of the strictest legal codes against racial intermarriage.”84 This 
strict code was not the product of incidental marriage regulation; 
rather, as the Loving court eventually held, it was based in racial 
animosity.85
The Loving case began when two Virginians, a Negro woman 
and a white man, were married in the District of Columbia.86 When 
they returned to Virginia, they were indicted under Virginia’s 
miscegenation ban; subsequently, they pled guilty and were later 
sentenced to one year in jail, to be suspended on the condition that 
they leave the state for twenty-five years.87 The couple returned to 
the District of Columbia, from whence they instituted a class action 
in Virginia state court seeking to declare the Virginia statute 
unconstitutional.88 The case progressed to the Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals, which upheld the statute’s constitutionality.89
In its decision reversing the Virginia court, the United States 
Supreme Court framed the question for review as “whether a 
statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent 
marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”90 In evaluating this question, the Court 
determined that the antimiscegenation statute was an effort to 
 83. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 84. Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in 
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1966) (footnote omitted). The reference is, 
of course, to John Smith and Pocahontas. 
 85. Professor Harvey Applebaum noted that “miscegenation” was “at the heart of racial 
prejudice.” Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social 
Problem, 53 GEO. L. REV. 49, 78–79 (1964). 
 86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
 87. Id. at 2–3. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
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promote an ideology of the superiority of the white race.91 The 
opinion initially noted a comment by the judge at the couple’s 
criminal trial: 
 Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such 
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did 
not intend for the races to mix.92
The Court noted the historical root of antimiscegenation laws 
“as an incident to slavery” and pointed out that Virginia’s ban was 
part of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924 enacted during a period of 
“extreme nativism.”93 This act included a requirement of “certificates 
of ‘racial composition’ to be kept by both local and state 
registrars.”94 The Supreme Court found it significant that an earlier 
Virginia Supreme Court decision had identified the following 
“legitimate purposes” of the antimiscegenation law: “‘to preserve the 
racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of 
blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial 
pride,’” all of which the United States Supreme Court identified as 
“obviously an endorsement of White Supremacy.”95
The Court further identified the “clear and central purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment” as “eliminat[ing] all official state 
sources of invidious racial discrimination.”96 The Court concluded 
that the challenged law rested “solely upon distinctions drawn 
according to race” and that there was “patently no legitimate 
overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination 
which justifies this classification.”97 The Court stated succinctly: 
“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely 
 91. Id. at 11. 
 92. Id. at 3. Not insignificantly, the trial court judge did not say that marriage itself was 
created to keep the races from mixing, but rather that the state had created antimiscegenation 
laws to effect what the judge believed was the intent of God—keeping the races separate. 
 93. Id. at 6. 
 94. Id. at 7. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 10. 
 97. Id. at 11. 
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because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”98
After Loving, Reverend Robert S. Drinan, then-Dean of the 
Boston College of Law, noted that “[i]n view of the undeniable 
racist motivation of Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law the Supreme 
Court did not really have to confront the question of limits of the 
state’s power to regulate the freedom of choosing one’s spouse.”99 
Another contemporaneous article said that the decision 
“represent[ed] an inevitable conclusion, rather than a major 
breakthrough of the Negroes’ quest for equal rights.”100
The important point is this: The historical context, the scholarly 
commentary, and the court decisions in Perez and Loving uniformly 
sustain the view that, with the antimiscegenation laws, the advocates 
of those laws were appropriating the marriage institution to further 
an ideology about something else—in this case, race. Acting on an 
accurate assessment of the institution of marriage as a powerful 
means to advance a social and political agenda essentially 
nonmarriage in its purposes, white supremacists used the law to 
change and then to highlight shared public meanings constituting 
the institution, all in an effort to implement their vision of the 
“good” society. With the Perez and Loving decisions, the law ceased 
to sustain that marriage project and affirmatively repudiated it. 
IV. THE USE OF THE PEREZ/LOVING ARGUMENT: 
THREE DECADES IN THE COURTS 
This issue—whether society may, consistent with constitutional 
guarantees of equality, sustain marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman—has been before American courts for more than thirty 
years.101 The constitutional challenges became a matter of 
considerable public interest for the first time with the 1993 Hawaii 
 98. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The Court added an alternative basis for its holding, 
one sounding in substantive due process: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Id. 
This alternative basis for the holding has been the launch pad for many circular arguments—
each beginning with an assertion of what marriage “is” as understood by the Court. 
 99. Robert S. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom To Marry 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 
358, 358–59 (1968). 
 100. Donald W. Merritt, Recent Case, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 507, 512 (1967). 
 101. See William C. Duncan, The Litigation To Redefine Marriage: Equality and Social 
Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004). 
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Supreme Court decision applying strict scrutiny analysis to the state’s 
marriage law.102 Public interest in the issue has intensified since 
November 2003, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
redefined marriage in the commonwealth as the union of any two 
persons.103 These cases, as well as all others over the years, have a 
common thread: they all cite Loving and/or Perez in some fashion or 
other relative to the same-sex couples’ challenge to man/woman 
marriage. But the courts have not agreed on the validity of the 
Perez/Loving argument or the lessons those cases have for the 
contemporary marriage issue. 
Just six years after Loving, the Minnesota case Baker v. Nelson104 
was the first reported case to weigh the constitutionality of a state 
marriage definition. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that Loving 
did not support a same-sex couples’ claim to redefine marriage 
because that case was decided on the basis of Virginia’s 
unconstitutional racial classification.105 The court further noted that 
the racial classifications in antimiscegenation statutes were 
fundamentally different than the sex classification in the marriage law 
being challenged in the case before it.106 The U.S. Supreme Court 
dismissed the subsequent appeal for failure to state a substantial 
federal question—a ruling on the merits.107
Not long after Baker, a Washington court of appeals similarly 
rejected the Perez/Loving argument.108 That court also held that 
Loving primarily involved the impermissibility of racial 
classifications.109 It further noted that while the Loving and Perez 
cases involved attempts by interracial couples to marry, the claim for 
same-sex marriage was really an attempt to change the “nature of 
marriage itself.”110
In the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision Baehr v. Lewin,111 
the plurality opinion discussed Loving at some length and asserted 
 102. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 103. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 104. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972). 
 105. Id. at 187. 
 106. Id. (“[T]here is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon 
race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”). 
 107. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 108. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 109. Id. at 1192 n.8. 
 110. Id. at 1191–92, 1995–96. 
 111. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
1STEWART.FIN 8/26/2005 12:01 PM 
555] Betrayal of Perez and Loving 
 577 
 
that the reasoning of Loving foreclosed the State’s argument that 
marriage is an inherently opposite-sex institution.112 Later in its 
opinion, the plurality cited Loving to rebut the State’s argument that 
the equal application of the marriage law to both men and women 
(neither can marry a person of their same gender) prevents a finding 
of sex discrimination.113 Specifically, the plurality said that this 
argument is akin to the argument that equal application of 
antimiscegenation law to individuals of different races rebuts a 
finding of unconstitutional racial discrimination.114 Ignoring a simple 
difference between the two contexts—antimiscegenation laws clearly 
intended to stamp nonwhites as inferior, while the limitation of 
man/woman marriage stamps neither sex as inferior or superior but 
treats both as equally necessary—the plurality used Loving’s rejection 
of “the notion that the mere ‘equal application’ of a statute 
containing racial classifications is enough”115 as adequate basis for its 
holding of sex discrimination.
In the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision Baker v. Vermont,116 
holding that the state’s constitution mandated the benefits of 
marriage for same-sex couples, a concurring and dissenting opinion 
by Justice Johnson argued that Vermont’s marriage statute is sex 
discrimination and, like the Hawaii plurality, cited Loving to establish 
that the equal application of the law is not relevant.117 The majority, 
 112. Id. at 61–63; see also David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201 (1998). Because the Loving 
decision did not address whether same-sex couples may marry, the plurality opinion needed a 
logical or factual link between Loving’s reasoning in its race-based context and the plurality’s 
conclusion in its sexual-orientation-based context, but the opinion provided no such link. 
Rather, the plurality opinion resorted to a rather supercilious tactic; it asserted (without 
support) that the State’s argument was analogous to the argument of the Virginia courts in 
Loving that “Deity had deemed” interracial marriages “intrinsically unnatural.” Baehr, 852 
P.2d at 63. The plurality then said: “With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone 
era, we do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine 
Will, and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that 
customs change with an evolving social order.” Id. Inasmuch as the State had not asserted that 
the marriage law was constitutional because of divine will or commandment and had not 
advanced a natural law argument, it is hard to escape the thought that the plurality invoked 
Loving for no defensible purpose other than to discredit the State’s argument by a judicially 
forced association.  
 113. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67–68. 
 114. Id. The validity and relevance of this comparison will be discussed infra Part IV. 
 115. Id. at 68 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967)).  
 116. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 117. Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). Stewart has previously criticized 
in some detail the Johnson opinion. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 85–95. 
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however, specifically disavowed this argument, stating that Justice 
Johnson’s opinion’s “reliance [on Loving] is misplaced.”118 Unlike 
the court in Loving, the Vermont majority found no intent to 
discriminate in the marriage law at issue.119 In fact, the majority held 
that “[p]laintiffs have not demonstrated that the exclusion of same-
sex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to 
discriminate against women or lesbians and gay men, as racial 
segregation was designed to maintain the pernicious doctrine of 
white supremacy.”120
A decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals held that Loving 
implicitly relied on the opposite-sex nature of marriage in holding 
that marriage was a fundamental right.121 The court reasoned that, 
because mandating genderless marriage would go much further than 
the Loving decision had gone, Loving did not compel the result that 
the plaintiffs sought.122 The court also cited Loving for the 
proposition that marriage is subject to appropriate state regulation 
and then concluded that the Arizona marriage statute involves such 
appropriate regulation because it advances the state interest in 
linking procreation and child rearing.123
In the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,124 mandating genderless 
marriage, the plurality opinion invoked Loving and Perez for the 
proposition that a right to marry means the right to choose whom 
one will marry.125 This opinion also analogized the antimiscegenation 
laws to man/woman marriage with the assertion that in both 
contexts marriage was denied “because of a single trait: skin color in 
 118. Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 n.13. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 887. 
 121. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 458 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 461–62. 
 124. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 125. Id. at 958. The plurality opinion ignored the reality that the plaintiffs’ (same-sex 
couples) “right to marry” of necessity consisted in this context of two rights and that the right 
to choose whom one will marry is only the totally dependent second right, the first being the 
right to alter the core meaning of marriage by redefinition. Because the opinion begins its 
analysis with a redescription (redefinition) of marriage as a close personal relationship of two 
adults and then proceeds to demonstrate that no good reason exists for limiting the “two 
adults” to a man and a woman, the plurality opinion’s equality-rights argument is “viciously 
circular.” Douglas Farrow, Rights and Recognition, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 
97, 98–101.  
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Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here.”126 In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Greaney went down the track of the Hawaii plurality 
opinion and its use of Loving’s rejection of the equal-application 
argument in support of the conclusion that man/woman marriage is 
a form of sex discrimination.127
The dissent by Justice Spina argued that the majority had 
mistakenly elevated the notion of “choice” as the essential element of 
marriage, contrary to what the court had done in Loving.128 Justice 
Spina noted: 
The “choice” to which the Supreme Court referred was the “choice 
to marry,” and it concluded that with respect to the institution of 
marriage, the State had no compelling interest in limiting the 
choice to marry along racial lines. The Supreme Court did not 
imply the existence of a right to marry a person of the same sex.129
In other words, Loving stands for the proposition that racial 
classifications are not grounds for denying the right to marry and 
does not stand for the proposition that marriage can and should be 
defined to suit individual desires. The dissent of Justice Cordy 
similarly argued that Loving and other United States Supreme Court 
marriage cases recognized marriage as a fundamental right because of 
the institution’s importance and because of the institution’s role in 
regulating the consequences of heterosexual procreation.130 The 
Cordy dissent characterized the majority’s approach to be, first, 
redefining marriage and then, second, declaring a right to the new 
institution to be fundamental.131
Two recent decisions from the State of Washington also invoked 
Loving, albeit in significantly different ways. In the first, a state trial 
judge invoked Loving for the proposition that the historical 
acceptance of a restriction does not make it constitutional.132 In the 
second, a federal bankruptcy court rejected a constitutional challenge 
to the Federal Defense of Marriage Act by noting that Loving relied 
 126. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.  
 127. Id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 975 (Spina, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 985 (Cordy, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 984. 
 132. Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *5 
(Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004). 
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on a finding of racial discrimination rather than the sex 
discrimination allegedly tainting the federal statute.133
Perhaps the most extensive treatment of the antimiscegenation 
cases is contained in one of the several marriage cases recently 
decided in the New York trial courts.134 That decision opened with 
an invocation of the Perez and Loving decisions, which the court 
linked to the claim of the same-sex couples who were before the 
court as plaintiffs: “[T]he freedom to choose whom to marry has 
consistently been the subject of political outcry and controversy.”135 
The court also invoked the antimiscegenation decisions to dismiss 
concerns about overturning the longstanding definition of marriage 
as the union of a man and a woman: “[T]he United States Supreme 
Court was not deterred by the deep historical roots of anti-
miscegenation laws.”136 The court further relied on Loving and Perez 
in identifying the right to marry as the right to choose one’s 
spouse137 and cited to Perez as an example of a state court refusing to 
consider the laws of other states in reaching its decision.138 Finally, 
the court invoked Loving while rejecting any deference to the 
legislature in the matter.139 In all, the court cited Loving at least 
eighteen times and Perez about a half-dozen times—a rather striking 
statistic given that the New York decision expressly limited its entire 
basis to the state constitution. 
Not surprisingly, the one California decision to date on the 
definition of marriage focused more on Perez than on Loving.140 In 
that opinion, a San Francisco trial court supported its holding that 
the California marriage statute constitutes impermissible sex 
discrimination by referring to Perez’s rejection of the equal-
application justification for the law.141
 133. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 134. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 
4, 2005). 
 135. Id. at *1. 
 136. Id. at *2. Unlike Loving, the New York trial court ignored, or was simply unaware 
of, the even older root stock of marriage into which the white supremacists’ marriage project 
grafted the foreign racial branch. 
 137. Id. at *13. 
 138. Id. at *16. 
 139. Id. at *23. 
 140. See In re Coordination Proceeding, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 14, 2005). 
 141. Id. at *9. 
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Those are the cases. As noted at the outset, the Perez/Loving 
argument is also ubiquitous in the public debate of the marriage 
issue. The argument packs a rhetorical punch. At the rhetorical level, 
it effectively (1) implies that support for man/woman marriage (and 
therefore, of necessity, opposition to genderless marriage) is morally 
akin to racism; (2) creates a sense of inevitability regarding 
genderless marriage; (3) consequently implies (especially to legacy-
conscious officials) that supporting genderless marriage is the only 
way to stay on the “right side of history”; and (4) fosters a particular 
self-perception in those accepting and implementing the argument—
a self-perception of equivalence with those who fought the great civil 
rights battles of earlier generations.142
V. USING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE AS A MEANS, 
 NOT AN END 
A. Evidences of the Use of Marriage To Achieve a Broader 
Cultural, Social, and Political Agenda 
 
The suggestion summarized in unvarnished form at the 
beginning of this Article is that, for the gay/lesbian rights 
movement, the institution of marriage is not really a destination but 
rather a powerful tool for the achievement of a broader cultural, 
social, and political agenda. Stated slightly differently, the primary 
objective of the campaign to redefine marriage is to bring that 
institution into service to the movement’s essentially nonmarriage 
agenda. That suggestion presupposes a number of things, and the 
accuracy of those presuppositions bears on the validity of the 
suggestion. We address those presuppositions, even though most are 
probably widely taken for granted.  
First, there is a gay/lesbian rights movement. That is not to say 
that it is monolithic in organization or objectives, or that it responds 
 142. Professor Douglas Farrow describes the mindset as follows: 
The struggle for gay marriage, like the struggle against the anti-miscegenation laws 
of America’s southern states, is a noble one that keeps alive the heroic spirit of the 
freedom marches. (Is that not what justifies the pictures we saw in the papers of 
Halpern judges celebrating their landmark decision over drinks, arm in arm with 
activists and former litigants?) The march toward freedom is still moving. The old 
are still young, and the only question is where to march next. 
Farrow, supra note 31, at 2–3. For more on the Halpern case, see infra note 145 and text 
accompanying notes 167 and 171. 
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to the directives of a highly centralized command and control 
apparatus. It is to say that the movement, with all the variety of its 
actors and all the shadings of its objectives and projects (and even 
with its schisms), is self-consciously a movement; its actors perceive it 
as a social movement of some force and consequence, and in 
important ways, they define themselves and formulate their projects 
in relation to that perception.143 Thus, it is sensible to speak of the 
gay/lesbian rights movement as an actual social phenomenon 
possessing both certain acknowledged (tacitly at least) social 
objectives as well as necessary social resources to make the 
movement’s pursuit of those objectives consequential.144
Next, the objectives of the gay/lesbian rights movement are 
rationally and emotionally consistent with the project to redefine 
marriage. Stated generally, the ultimate objective is a society 
affording wide acceptance of the equal moral validity of gay and 
lesbian life experiences and thus affording to gays and lesbians equal 
social opportunity and freedom from adverse treatment.145 For a 
number of fairly obvious reasons, judicial imposition of genderless 
marriage is seen as advancing that objective. 
Next, the gay/lesbian rights movement, as a movement, has in 
fact pursued the redefinition of marriage and in the process devoted 
considerable resources to the task. A prime example is the 
thoroughly orchestrated, systematic, and persistent effort of key 
components of the movement—such as Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, and 
 143. See, e.g., PATRICIA A. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND 
COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000); Even Wolfson, All 
Together Now, in MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 3 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. 
eds., 2003); Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: Clarifying 
Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 511 (2003).  
 144. NeJaime, supra note 143.  
 145. See, e.g., Halpern v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161, at para. 5 (Ont. 2003) (“This public 
recognition and sanction of marital relationships reflect society’s approbation of the personal 
hopes, desires and aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal relationships. This can 
only enhance an individual’s sense of self-worth and dignity.”). 
NeJaime notes this opening statement of the Human Rights Campaign’s Annual 
Report: “As the nation’s largest lesbian and gay political organization, the Human Rights 
Campaign envisions an America where lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people are 
ensured of their basic equal rights—and can be open, honest and safe at home, at work and in 
the community.” NeJaime, supra note 143, at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, 
ANNUAL REPORT: APRIL 1, 2000–MARCH 31, 2001 (2001)).  
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the National Center for Lesbian Rights—to raise state constitutional 
challenges in judicial systems thought likely to be sympathetic. These 
key components build on each success (by proceeding to the next 
most likely court), avoid sure and even likely losers, and calibrate the 
timing of each step to maximize speed consistent with avoidance of a 
too-rapid advance that might bring forth adverse judicial rulings in 
jurisdictions that, just a year or two later and with more “evolving 
social developments,” might bring forth judicial victories. 146  
Those are the points widely taken for granted. We now turn to 
an essential link in the logic/evidence chain. It is that, although 
most of the leadership and a strong majority of the movement’s 
adherents favor the campaign for genderless marriage, relatively few 
of those have a manifested intent to marry once they can. More 
specifically, the emerging accounts and reports from jurisdictions 
where same-sex couples may legally marry reveal two patterns. First, 
the strong majority of the gay and lesbian community appear to 
desire the redefinition of marriage from the union of a man and a 
woman to the union of any two persons and, thus, reject legislative 
solutions that grant same-sex couples virtually all the benefits of 
marriage except use of the word “marriage.”147 Second, the number 
of same-sex couples actually entering marriage when they can do so 
legally is relatively small and is marked by a downward trend.148
Regarding the second pattern, the example of the Netherlands—
the first country to move from man/woman marriage to genderless 
marriage—is instructive. The infrequent use and downward trend of 
marriage can be seen in a press release issued by Statistics 
Netherlands—a department of that country’s Ministry of Economic 
Affairs.149 The release notes that in 2001, when marriage was 
officially redefined to include same-sex couples, there were 2400 
 146. See David J. Garrow, Toward a More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, § 6, 
at 52; see also Duncan, supra note 101, at 645–47. 
 147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the 
Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001). 
 148. David Frum, A Blow to Canada’s Families, NAT’L POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A20 
(“[Eighteen] months after same-sex marriage arrived in Canada, some 98% of adult Canadian 
gays have chosen to ignore their new legal right.”); Noelle Knox, European Gay-Union Trends 
Influence U.S. Debate, USA TODAY, July 14, 2004, at 5A (noting a forty percent decrease in 
the number of same-sex couples contracting marriage in the Netherlands since the law became 
available).  
 149. Press Release, Statistics Netherlands, More Marriages and More Partnerships (Nov. 
27, 2002), available at www.cbs.nl/en/publications/press-releases/2002/pb02e244.pdf. 
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same-sex marriages but this number dropped to 1900 in 2002.150 
The release says: “Same-sex couples do not seem to be very 
interested in marriage. Statistics Netherlands estimates that there are 
about 50 thousand same-sex couples in the Netherlands, of whom 
less than 10 percent has married so far.”151 Since the press release was 
issued, the downward trend has continued: the number of same-sex 
marriages dropped to 1500 in 2003152 and 1100 in 2004.153
This statistical evidence is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
from Canada and the United States. As an editor of a Canadian gay 
magazine in Toronto stated, “Ambiguity is a good word for the 
feeling among gays about marriage . . . .”154 The journalist reporting 
such comments noted that: 
[This] ambivalence is reflected in the numbers of gay couples who 
have chosen marriage so far. While members of Toronto’s gay 
population, by far Canada’s largest, express support of the Ontario 
court’s ruling and Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s decision to 
introduce legislation to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide, they 
have not mobilized to defend the change.155
 The article further notes that in the first months after the 
decision to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in Ontario, 
only a few hundred same-sex couples sought marriage licenses at the 
Toronto city hall—a small fraction of the 6685 same-sex couples 
registered as domestic partners in Toronto.156 More recently, the 
same journalist has noted that the rate of same-sex marriages has 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.; see also D. MANTING & J.A. LOEVE, ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNION 
DISSOLUTION OF COUPLES IN THE 1990S IN THE NETHERLANDS 4–5 (Mar. 16, 2004), 
available at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/maatschappij/bevolking/papers/ 
economic-circumstances-union-dissolution.pdf; LIESBETH STEENHOF & CAREL HARMSEN, 
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE NETHERLANDS 10 (2003), available at http://www.cbs.nl/nl/ 
publicaties/publicaties/maatschappij/bevolking/papers/same-sex-couples.pdf. 
 152. VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE COLLECTION OF 
DATA TO MEASURE THE EXTENT AND IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION IN A SELECTION OF 
COUNTRIES: FINAL REPORT ON THE NETHERLANDS 26 (June 2004), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/fundamental_rights/pdf/aneval/pb_en.pdf. 
 153. See Statistics Netherlands, Population by Month, Quarter, and Year (2004), at 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/Start.asp?lp=Search/Search&LA=EN&DM=SLEN (last 
visited May 11, 2005). 
 154. Clifford Krauss, Now Free To Marry, Canada’s Gays Say, ‘Do I?,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
31, 2003, §1, at 1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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been falling since the redefinition of marriage in Canada, despite the 
fact that 34,200 same-sex couples registered as permanent partners 
in the 2001 census, the large majority of whom have not married.157 
Another article quotes a “coordinator of the office for queer issues at 
the University of Toronto” as saying: “It’s an accomplishment, the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. But I think the desire for it in the 
community simply doesn’t match that accomplishment.”158 In 
Montreal, another man from the gay/lesbian community is quoted 
as saying: “‘It’s important to get the choice, but I don’t really want 
to get married. . . . It’s for the igaliti,’ he said—equality, ‘Just feeling 
as the others.’”159
A media report from Provincetown, Massachusetts, focusing on a 
same-sex couple who had lived together for 15 years notes: 
[The couple] believe[s] that gays should have the right to marry, 
both as a matter of simple equality and as a form of legal 
protection. 
 But that doesn’t mean they necessarily want to exercise that 
right. “Do we need the marriage ceremony or all of the inherent 
baggage that goes with it?”160  
Other accounts from the American gay and lesbian community 
also reflect this sharp distinction between capturing the right to 
marry and actually exercising it, with the first endeavor having 
widespread support while the second languishes. 
In sum, the evidence is of a large disparity between the gay and 
lesbian community’s support for the right of same-sex couples to 
marry, on the one hand, and actual exercise of that right, on the 
other hand. We see this evidence as probative of the suggestion 
summarized at the beginning of this Article: For the gay/lesbian 
rights movement qua movement, the institution of marriage is not 
 157. Clifford Krauss, The Right To Marry, or Not To Marry, Is the Issue Among Canada’s 
Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, § 4, at 14 (“Only an estimated 4,500 couples . . . have tied 
the knot in Canada since the first [court] decision . . . opened the door.”).  
 158. Matthew Hays, Dodging the Altar: Gay Men and Lesbians Aren’t Exactly Rushing To 
Marry in Canada, THE ADVOCATE, May 11, 2004, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1589/is_2004_May_11/ai_n6152730. 
 159. Anne C. Mulkern, Canada Offers Preview of Gay-Marriage Impacts, DENVER POST, 
July 4, 2004, at A1. 
 160. Don Aucoin, For Gays, No Unanimity on Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 2003, 
at A1. 
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really a destination but rather a powerful tool for the achievement of 
a broader cultural, social, and political agenda. Stated slightly 
differently, the primary objective of the campaign to redefine 
marriage is to bring that institution into service for the movement’s 
essentially nonmarriage agenda. We know of no other plausible 
account of the evidence. 
B. The “Atypical Couples Tactic” 
We also perceive an effort to mask or obscure what has been 
going on with the new project to appropriate marriage. The 
gay/lesbian rights movement has skillfully and often successfully 
deployed what may fairly be called the “atypical couples tactic.” This 
tactic uses as the public face of the genderless marriage campaign a 
number of carefully selected same-sex couples virtually 
indistinguishable (except for gender) from Ozzie and Harriet Nelson 
or Clair and Heathcliff Huxtable and then points relentlessly to those 
couples as the “answer” to what the genderless marriage campaign is 
all about.161 The phrase “atypical couples tactic” is fair because such 
couples constitute a quite small portion of the gay and lesbian 
community162 and because the movement, and especially its most 
active litigating components—Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund163 and Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD)164—
is indeed being consciously tactical:  
 161. See, e.g., LAMBDA LEGAL, NEW JERSEY: FAMILY PROFILES, at http://www.lambda 
legal.org/binary-data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/133.pdf (last visited May 10, 2005).  
 162. We have no desire to enter into the highly contentious subject of gay/lesbian 
demographics; our review of the literature, however, supports the essential accuracy of this 
conclusion by Dr. Timothy J. Dailey: “[O]nly a small minority of gays and lesbians choose to 
live in partnered relationships, and furthermore, only a small percentage of partnered 
homosexual households actually have children.” Timothy J. Dailey, Comparing the Lifestyles of 
Homosexual Couples to Married Couples, INSIGHT (March 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=IS04C02. 
 163. Lambda is based in New York City and pursues “impact litigation,” an example 
being the test case in New Jersey, Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). For more information about Lambda’s litigation efforts, 
including its activity with regards to the appeal of Lewis, see http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/iowa/cases/summary.html (last visited May 10, 2005).   
 164. GLAD is based in Boston and successfully prosecuted the same-sex marriage cases in 
Vermont, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), and Massachusetts, Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). For more information about GLAD’s litigation 
efforts, see http://www.glad.org (last visited May 10, 2005). 
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At times, lawyers must construct identities in order to achieve legal 
reform. For instance, if the judiciary proves sympathetic to a 
particular gay identity—e.g., homosexual as respectable family 
member—advocates will use such identity to obtain desirable 
results . . . . 
 . . . . 
Much like Lambda, GLAD relies on . . . normalizing rhetoric and 
. . . goes to great lengths to discuss the plaintiff couples and 
describe their lives in hetero-normative terms. While the couples 
are technically GLAD’s clients, they are held up as signifiers for the 
broader constituency seeking marriage rights. They are meant to be 
representative, both in the sense of being ideal within society and 
ordinary within GLBT circles. . . . [T]he plaintiff couples are meant 
to typify most other gay couples . . . .165
 Here are examples of the successful use of that tactic. In cases 
mandating genderless marriage in British Columbia,166 Ontario,167 
and Massachusetts,168 advocates of man/woman marriage sought to 
argue that alteration in the core and constitutive meaning of the 
marriage institution would greatly alter the institution and its role in 
society and thereby jeopardize the institution’s social goods. In the 
two contexts where this argument was relevant, the courts elided it.  
 In the first context, the likelihood of institutional change, the 
Goodridge plurality opinion in Massachusetts presented as proof of 
“no change” the intentions of the same-sex couples then before the 
court: “Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to 
undermine the institution of civil marriage,”169 and “[t]hat same-sex 
couples are willing to [enter civil marriage] . . . is a testament to the 
enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human spirit.”170 
In Ontario, Halpern took the same tack: “The Couples are not 
seeking to abolish the institution of marriage; they are seeking access 
to it.”171 (But, as we have noted elsewhere, “the probative value of 
 165. NeJaime, supra note 143, at 519, 545 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is 
worth noting that the referenced constituency seeks marriage rights, not marriage.
 166. EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, 13 B.C.L.R.4th 1 (B.C. 2003).  
 167. Halpern v. Toronto, 65 O.R.3d 161 (Ont. 2003). 
 168. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 169. Id. at 965. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161, at para. 129. 
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such intentions and willingness is not at all apparent; it seems 
nonsensical that the intentions of a handful of people could insulate 
a vast social institution constituted by its public meanings from 
change resulting from a profound alteration in those meanings.”172) 
In the second context, the strength of the societal interests in 
preserving man/woman marriage, the courts again turned away from 
the social institutional realities to the feelings of the couples. 
[A] central feature of the language from the[se] . . . cases . . . is its 
shift to the personal perspective—“the personal hopes, desires and 
aspirations,” “the professed commitment of two individuals,” and 
the “deeply personal commitment of the marriage partners to one 
another”. The societal interest and role in all this couple-
centeredness is only “public celebration” of it, that is, society is an 
important guest at the wedding. But a wedding is not a marriage. A 
marriage seems better understood as participation in and 
engagement with a rich, complex, influential social institution 
whose meanings and deep logic seem best accounted for primarily 
by reference to societal interests, not individual hopes and 
desires.173
This shift to “the personal perspective” qualifies as a “successful” 
deployment of the atypical couples tactic because, “when speaking of 
civil marriage, the shift in judicial focus to the wedding and to other 
manifestations of the personal perspective and away from society’s 
interests embedded in and served by the institution of marriage of 
necessity diminishes the force of those societal interests in the equality 
analysis.”174
VI. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
We believe that the work of the prior sections rather strongly 
validates this conclusion: The means successfully employed by the 
white supremacist movement to advance its essentially nonmarriage 
 172. Stewart, supra note 5, at 79. 
 173. Id. at 61. 
 174. Id. at 62. It seems fair to say that there is a contest within the larger contest and that 
it is a contest between a “macro” perspective and a “micro” perspective. The former 
comprehends the social institutional realities summarized supra Part II, while the latter is 
highly atomistic, with its personal rights rhetoric. Across the arenas where the larger contest is 
waged, we have observed that genderless marriage advocates, as a general rule, decline to 
engage the macro perspective and, when it is thrust before them, quickly revert to the 
arguments and rhetoric of the micro perspective. 
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agenda—altering the core meaning of marriage—is of a kind with 
the means being employed by the gay/lesbian rights movement to 
advance its essentially nonmarriage agenda. Now, it does not 
necessarily follow, in abstract logic, that the means, because of a 
kind, are unjustified in both cases.175 Some advocates of redefinition 
may well argue that the contemporary movement’s objectives are 
laudable and justify the means, while the discredited objectives of the 
older movement did not; in other words, that the ends here and now 
justify the means, whereas the ends then and there did not. But what 
is called for, it seems to us, is that this “the ends justify the means” 
argument engage, not elide, two realities: one, redefinition as indeed 
a means to implement a broader and nonmarriage agenda and, two, 
redefinition as a profoundly consequential alteration—indeed, a 
dismantling—of the vital social institution of man/woman 
marriage.176 The second may be seen as the “price tag” hanging on 
the first. 
Our reflections on that price tag run as follows: Our society can 
sustain one and only one marriage institution. Society cannot, at the 
same time, tell the people (and especially the children) that marriage 
is the union of any two persons and that marriage is the union of a 
man and a woman. Two “coexisting” social institutions known 
society-wide as marriage is a factual impossibility. Thus, success of 
the gay/lesbian rights movement’s marriage project will in the 
process of time necessarily displace the institution of man/woman 
marriage and necessarily deprive society of the social goods provided, 
sometimes uniquely, by the old institution.177 So, although one may 
 175. We have no intent to do to genderless marriage advocates what their use of the 
Perez/Loving argument has done to their opponents—implied that their position is morally 
akin to racism. 
 176. The scholarship of Katherine K. Young and Paul Nathanson accounts, in our 
judgment, for the contemporary marriage project’s much greater destructive effect on the 
marriage institution, compared to the effect of the older white supremacist marriage project. 
Young and Nathanson, based on “[c]omparative research on the worldviews of both small-
scale societies and those of world religions,” conclude: “Marriage has universal, nearly 
universal, and variable features.” Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an 
Experiment, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 45. The redefinition of marriage 
implemented by the white supremacists affected only a variable feature: “endogamy (marrying 
within a group) or exogamy (marrying outside it).” Id. By contrast, the redefinition from the 
union of a man and a woman to the union of any two persons counters a number of the 
universal and nearly universal features of marriage. Id. 
 177. What we are saying contrasts starkly with the old “definitional preclusion,” “natural 
limits,” and “marriage as supra-legal construct” arguments. Each of those, in its own way, says 
in effect that something essential to marriage precludes alteration by the law and, hence, by 
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by selective reference to social institutional realities tout genderless 
marriage as the way to a more just and equal society, the full panoply 
of relevant institutional realities compels acknowledgement of the 
awesome price that must be paid for entry into such a radically new 
and different world. 
How large the price is suggested by a listing of what must of 
necessity be lost with the deinstitutionalization of man/woman 
marriage: 
First, husbands and wives. Man/woman marriage is the only 
institution that can confer the status of husband and wife, that can 
transform a male into a husband (a social identity quite different 
from “partner”),178 and thus that can transform males into 
husband/fathers (a category of males particularly beneficial to 
society).179
Second, an effective bridge over the male-female divide. 
“[M]arriage has always been the central cultural site of male-female 
relations”180 and society’s primary and most effective means of 
bridging the male-female divide—that “massive cultural effort of 
every human society at all times and in all places.”181
Third, the most effective means humankind has developed so far 
to maximize the level of private welfare provided to the children 
conceived by passionate, heterosexual coupling.182 The phrase private 
welfare includes not just the provision of physical needs such as food, 
clothing, and shelter; it encompasses opportunities such as 
education, play, work, and discipline and intangibles such as love, 
respect, and security. 
Fourth, the effective means to make real the child’s right to 
know and to be brought up by his or her biological parents (with 
society. We are saying plainly that the law and, hence, a society do indeed have the power to 
alter the constitutive meaning of marriage in that society; the real issue is the wisdom of doing 
so. We need to say at the same time that, as a matter of social institutional reality, same-sex 
couples cannot enter the marriage institution that has come down to us; their law-mandated 
marriage constitutes entry into a different institution, one defined at its core as the union of 
any two persons and one embodying the close personal relationship model of marriage. 
Stewart, supra note 5, at 84 (“Same-sex couples look to the law to let them into the privileged 
institution, and the law . . . may want to, but it cannot; it can only give them access to a 
different institution of different value.”). 
 178. See, e.g., DeCoste, supra note 27, at 625–26. 
 179. See, e.g., POPENOE, supra note 29, at 139–88. 
 180. Cere, supra note 6, at 14. 
 181. Young & Nathanson, supra note 28, at 43. 
 182. Stewart, supra note 5, at 44–52. 
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exceptions being justified only in the best interests of the child, not 
those of any adult). 
[A]ccepting same-sex marriage necessarily means accepting that the 
societal institution of marriage is intended primarily for the benefit 
of the partners to the marriage, and only secondarily for the 
children born into it. And it means abolishing the norm that 
children—whatever their sexual orientation later proves to be—
have a prima facie right to know and be reared within their own 
biological family by their mother and father. Carefully restricted, 
governed, and justified exceptions to this norm, such as adoption, 
are essential. But abolishing the norm would have a far-reaching 
impact.183
Fifth, authoritative encouragement of the child-rearing mode—
that is, married mother/father child-rearing—that correlates (in ways 
not subject to reasonable dispute)184 with the optimal outcomes 
deemed crucial for a child’s (and hence society’s) well being. These 
outcomes include physical, mental, and emotional health and 
development; academic performance and levels of attainment; and 
avoidance of crime and other forms of self- and other-destructive 
behavior such as drug abuse and high-risk sexual conduct.185
 183. Margaret Somerville, What About the Children?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra 
note 6, at 67. 
 184. As Justice Sosman said in her dissenting opinion in Goodridge: 
[S]tudies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences between 
children raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex couples. 
Interpretation of the data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the 
personal and political beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the differences 
identified are positive or negative, and as to the untested explanations of what might 
account for those differences. (This is hardly the first time in history that the 
ostensible steel of the scientific method has melted and buckled under the intense 
heat of political and religious passions.) . . . [T]he most neutral and strict application 
of scientific principles to this field would be constrained by the limited period of 
observation that has been available. . . . The Legislature can rationally view the state 
of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the critical question it now faces: are 
families headed by same-sex parents equally successful in rearing children from 
infancy to adulthood as families headed by parents of opposite sexes? 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 979–80 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted).  
 185. Stewart, supra note 5, at 64–70.  
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Sixth, the power to officially endorse that form of adult 
intimacy—married heterosexual intercourse—that society may 
rationally value above all other such forms.186
The arguments marshaled to discount this price tag or even to 
deny its existence strike us as fundamentally inadequate. The first 
and most often deployed argument simply ignores the social 
institutional realities of marriage: “Redefinition will not really change 
anything. Just as many straight men and women will marry—and 
have just as many children—if gays can marry or not.”187 But this 
mantra entirely misses the point. The point is what the straight men 
and women will be marrying “into.” They will be marrying into a 
much different social institution than their parents married into 
simply because, undeniably, a constitutive core meaning will be 
radically different. And that means that they (and the generations 
after them) will undergo a much different formative and 
transformative experience. 
The inadequacy of this “no downside” argument does not end 
there. Social institutions are renewed and strengthened by use 
consistent with the shared public meanings constituting them. 
“[E]ach use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that 
institution. Cars and shirts wear out as we use them but constant use 
renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage . . . .”188 After 
redefinition, every use of the new institution by a man/woman 
couple will validate and reinforce it; after all, that couple will be 
invoking on their union the sanctioning power of a polity that 
rigorously views their union as one between “two persons.” Because 
those “two persons” happen to be a man and a woman, the 
 186. Id. at 54–57. Because the redefinition occurs by judicial mandate, assertedly 
compelled by constitutional norms—this being the context in which the Perez/Loving 
argument is deployed—any official or “state action” acknowledgement of marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman is Constitution-taboo. 
 187. Another “argument” may actually be moving into first position among genderless 
marriage advocates. It is simply to proceed from the assumed or implied premise that of course 
man/woman marriage violates equality norms and constitutes discrimination. In other words, 
the speaker proceeds as if she “owns” the words equality and discrimination. From this 
beginning, it is not difficult to move to the conclusion that man/woman marriage violates 
equality norms and constitutes discrimination. But it goes without saying (or rather, should go 
without saying) that what the contest is all about is the meaning of equality and discrimination 
in the context of marriage, particularly its social institutional realities. The increasingly popular 
new “argument,” being wholly circular, hinders rather than helps in reaching an understanding 
of the rational use of those two words in the marriage context. 
 188. SEARLE, supra note 11, at 57. 
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consequences may initially be misunderstood by many or even most, 
but the strengthening effect on the new institution is largely 
unavoidable.189 Thus the argument—“just as many straight men and 
women will marry”— actually cuts against, not in favor of, 
genderless marriage once willful blindness toward the social 
institutional realities is no longer tolerated. 
The other main argument advanced to discount or to evaporate 
the cost of this price tag is the following: “The law won’t really have 
that big of an impact on a fundamental social institution. People 
know what they think; it doesn’t matter what the law says is right. 
Something like marriage will just go on as before.” This appeal to 
the impotency of the law, of course, ignores the historical truth that 
when in America the law starts a current running through society—
and does so in the name of the Constitution—that current will 
broaden and deepen and become ever swifter until it has transformed 
the landscape. The ending of de jure segregation in the South after 
Brown v. Board of Education190 amounted to “revolutionary racial 
change,”191 and other than the end of apartheid in South Africa, it is 
difficult to identify in history a social transformation of equal 
magnitude effected without war. There is something almost 
astounding in the irony of the “impotent law” argument being used 
in the same context with the Perez/Loving argument. 
To understand the “impotent law” argument’s kinship with the 
“enclave” argument is to further understand the inadequacy of both 
arguments. The “enclave” argument is that those in our society who 
do not agree with the teachings and formative influences of the 
genderless marriage institution and the interests that institution 
advances can simply enter an enclave—linguistic, social, and/or 
religious—where they can do their own marriage thing unaffected by 
the new social institution. But as we have noted elsewhere,192 there 
 189. We say “largely” because a man and a woman desiring to avoid complicity with the 
new institutional regime could fulfill that desire—but only by openly participating in a 
decidedly exclusive marriage ceremony sanctioned only by a decidedly exclusive norm 
community (in other words, by openly foregoing civilly sanctioned genderless marriage by 
means of a consciously political act). The price for doing so includes forfeiting the benefits of 
civil marriage and being officially labeled as bigoted (or at least “discriminatory”)—that is, as 
hostile to the constitutional ideal of equality. 
 190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 191. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 7, 11 (1994). 
 192. Stewart, supra note 5, at 82–83. 
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are problems with the notion that resourceful people could still find 
ways to communicate to the next generations of children the unique 
goods of man/woman marriage and its value. Certainly some might; 
by private educational endeavor it is possible for families or other 
groups to establish a sort of linguistic enclave in the heart of a 
community that has no comprehension of what matters to them. But 
to the degree that members of the enclave were to adopt the speech 
of the community, they would lose the power to name and, in large 
part, the power to discern what once mattered to their forbears. To 
that degree, their forbears’ ways would seem implausible to them, 
and probably even unintelligible. The bare possibility that people 
could, with considerable difficulty and sacrifice, maintain the 
meanings for their children of man/woman marriage is therefore just 
that—a bare possibility. 
The possibility becomes even less substantial upon realization 
that 
[t]o change the core meaning of marriage from the union of a man 
and a woman . . . to the union of any two persons [will result in] 
. . . the new meaning [being] mandated in texts, in schools, and in 
many other parts of the public square and voluntarily published by 
the media and other institutions, with society, especially its 
children, thereby losing the ability to discern the meanings of the 
old institution.193
Only an excessively sanguine artist would paint this post-
redefinition picture: the State of (fill in the blank: Massachusetts, 
California, etc.) as the happy home of many different marriage norm 
communities, each doing its own marriage thing, each equally valid 
before the law, each equally secure in its own space. There is reason 
to believe that the genuinely realistic picture as a matter of legal and 
social fact is far different: The state mandates by force of polity-wide 
law one and only one marriage institution and one and only one 
 193. Id. at 111. Helen Reece’s observation merits repetition here: 
When norms are socially contested, this can lead to the formation of diverse norm 
communities, such as religious organisations or feminist groups, so that people who 
are dissatisfied with the prevailing norms can enter a different and more congenial 
norm community. But this is not a complete solution because the social 
construction of choices runs too deep: the dissident community may seem 
unthinkable or may be too costly for someone raised in the dominant community; it 
may also be merely reactive to or even defined by the dominant norm community. 
REECE, supra note 15, at 38. 
1STEWART.FIN 8/26/2005 12:01 PM 
555] Betrayal of Perez and Loving 
 595 
 
marriage norm, and that is genderless marriage. That norm will be 
mandated in and reinforced by texts, mandated in and reinforced by 
schools, and mandated in and reinforced by many other parts of the 
public square and, furthermore, will be voluntarily published by the 
media and other institutions. One marriage norm community will be 
officially sanctioned and protected; all other marriage norm 
communities will be officially constrained, will be officially 
disdained.194 To say otherwise is to say that the law, as an institution 
itself, would not be subject to strong institutional mandates—some 
sounding in logic and consistency, some in more elementary 
considerations—to be persistent and thoroughgoing in enforcing its 
newly declared “constitutional” norm. In the same vein, to say 
otherwise is to say that the law is impotent to reinforce, to alter, or 
to dismantle social institutions, and no rational, informed person says 
that. No, the law is tremendously potent in this area, and the 
unavoidable price of using the law to enthrone the genderless 
marriage institution is the dismantling and loss (if not immediately, 
then certainly sooner rather than later) of the marriage institution 
heretofore central in our society. 
 194. Farrow, supra note 125, at 101–02 (“The preamble to this draft legislation [the 
Chrétien government’s proposed genderless marriage bill of 2003] indicates that redefining 
marriage to make it accessible to same-sex couples will ‘reflect values of tolerance, respect and 
equality’ consistent with the Charter. But of course it follows that those who oppose 
redefinition do not reflect such values. This charge, publicly made and enshrined in law, can 
only diminish the respect in which such people are held . . . .”); Darrel Reid & Janet Epp 
Buckingham, Whose Rights? Whose Freedoms?, in DIVORCING MARRIAGE, supra note 6, at 84 
(“The fact is that millions of Canadians who are opposed to same-sex marriage have now been 
told by the courts that their view on marriage is contrary to the Charter and, by extension, un-
Canadian.”). 
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